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AIRSPACE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AS AFFECTED
BY AIRCRAFT OPERATION:t II
III.
Rights and Liabilities Respecting Aircraft Flight Other Than
Landing and Taking-off
A. General Airspace Rights and Interests:
Nonaviation cases clearly reveal that the surface occupant
is entitled to the undisturbed use and enjoyment of the
superjacent airspace to at least a height which will preserve
to him the reasonable use and enjoyment of the land.7 5 The
cujus est solum maxim has generally been applied where it
was not essential and where the same solution could have
been reached by using the "effective user" theory 76 or the
"normal use" rule. Some publicists hold that the latter rule
divides the airspace into upper and lower zones, and that
entry into the lower zone alone constitutes a trespass, and
then only if made without the owner's permission. Of course,
due allowance is made in each case for a determination of
the proper height of the lower zone.77 The invasion of a
person's right to privacy also should be given consideration,
and this necessarily involves the use to which the aeronaut is
placing his aircraft. For example, the minimum altitude for
a commercial aircraft on a fast through flight might be
considerably less than that for a sight-seeing aircraft, a
This is the second of two installments of this article. The first appeared
in the Summer Issue of Volume XXVI of the Notre Dame Lawyer. [Editor's note.]
75 This was very well stated in Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270
Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385, 390 (1930), where the court said: "For the purposes of
this decision we assume that private ownership of airspace extends to all reasonable
heights above the underlying land. It would be vain to treat property in airspace
upon the same footing as property which can be seized, touched, occupied, handled,
cultivated, built upon and utilized in -its every feature."
76 For a case illustrating this theory, see Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,
84 F. (2d) 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431,
81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
77 Lu~roN, CiviL AVIATION LAW § 52 (1935).
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hovering plane, balloon, or similar slow-moving equipment.
It might also be that privacy against photography may
impose a different rule applicable to invasions of airspace.
Some attempts have been made to classify the decisions
according to established rules of the law of torts under
absolute liability, negligence, trespass, or nuisance.' 8 None of
these provide satisfactory standards for determining liability
resulting from the infringement of the surface occupant's
rights. It may be that this new adventure of man which
endows him with some of the abilities of air-borne creatures
cannot be controlled by the old adaptations of basic natural
law to surface-locked human endeavors. Consequently, new
applications of the fundamental law of the rights of man
to the free use and enjoyment of his life and property as
long as he refrains from infringing upon the law and upon
the rights of others must be reviewed to provide an equitable
aviation law. The old rules should be relied upon more as
guides than as absolute law. This, however, has not been the
prevalent practice of the courts, which, under our system
of following precedents and stare decisis, at times are bur-
dened by an almost insuperable inertia and inability to adapt
themselves to new conditions of life.
B. Judicial Interpretations of Rules on Airspace Rights in
General:
A review of typical cases will illustrate how the courts
have searched for a basis on which to determine the con-
flicting interests of the parties involved, and will indicate
that courts may at times be conscious of the sociological
effect of their decisions.
Some courts have considered aircraft dangerous per se,
and have imposed absolute liability for all damage caused by
their operation, as in the old squib case.79 At least the courts
78 HOTxHKISS, THE LAW OF AviAiox §§ 16-36 (2d ed. 1938); LupTON, op. cit.
supra note 77, §§101-10.
79 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (K.B. 1773).
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have given this as the reason for their decisions. Thus, in
Guille v. Swan,8 ° a New York court held a balloonist liable
for damages caused by his physical trespass when he acci-
dentally landed in a garden. He was also charged with the
additional damage caused by the crowd which trampled the
garden as curious onlookers or souvenir seekers and which
came to his aid when he cried for help while descending. He
was held strictly accountable for the foreseeability of the
accident and its results. While this decision seems fair, might
not a better reason for the responsibility have been found to
lie in the negligence of the balloonist for ascending so near
to the residence in question? True, the foreseeability element
was present as a determining factor, but did this, under the
circumstances, not result in negligence on the part of the
balloonist rather than in liability for setting in motion an
inherently dangerous device?
Similarly, some commentators ascribe various motives for
decisions which may not be fully justified. Neiswonger v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.8 has been considered as sup-
porting the absolute liability doctrine, 2 while it was probably
based on the more fundamental ground of infringement of
the land occupant's right to freedom from invasion of the
superjacent airspace by low-flying aircraft. In this case, a
farmer recovered for damage caused by a blimp which flew
low over his horses. Also, the decision in Rochester Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Dunlop 83 might be misinterpreted because
of the dual causes of action presented. The first cause based
on negligence and specifically on res ipsa loquitur was dis-
missed on the ground that it would be unreasonable to say
that the crash of the plane into the power line tower at night
necessarily indicated that the pilot was negligent. The court
80 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1882). See Lu'rox, op. cit. supra note 77, §102.
81 35 F. (2d) 761 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
82 LuPToN, op. cit. supra note 77, § 102.
83 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469 (Monroe County Ct. 1933).
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upheld the second cause based on absolute liability for
trespass 84 and only the question of damages was presented
to the jury.
A difficult case to reconcile on any theory is Nebraska
Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc. 5 which was
dismissed on the ground that damages could not be pre-
dicated upon the abortions of vixens which were frightened
by planes flying low over a fox farm. This case might be
viewed as supporting the theory that passage through the
airspace over land is not a trespass of the occupant's prop-
erty. But it is obvious that here, there was an infringement
of the occupant's right to the undisturbed use and normal
enjoyment of the land. It is possible that the plaintiff's case
was based on the theory of absolute ownership of the space
to all altitudes, and that insistence upon recovery under
this premise was rightly denied; however, if so, the decision
has been generally misunderstood. 6 It would seem that cases
of this type should be governed by a "first bite" rule, as is
used when dogs are involved. 7 That is, unless warned, the
aircraft operator should be entitled to fly above a conven-
tionally determined minimum altitude without liability, but
once apprised of a condition requiring special care, he must
act accordingly.
C. Publicists' Views on Airspace Use and Interests Gen-
erally:
It is interesting to note the views of various publicists
in this field who have given much serious thought to the
problems involved.
Bouv6 88 has cited with approval Sir Frederick Pollock's
view that passage of an airplane over land, like that of a
84 Id., 266 N.Y. Supp. at 473. See also LuroN, op. cit. supra note 77, §102.
85 [1932] U.S. Av. R. 164. (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Neb., Omaha Div. 1931).
86 LP mN, op. cit. supra note 77, §102.
87 Domm v. Hollenbeck, 259 Il. 382, 102 N.E. 782 (1913).
88 Bouve, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 Am L. Ray. 232, 376 (1930).
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projectile may be a trespass where it is through airspace close
to the ground and where it affects the normal and reasonable
enjoyment of the land. This rule seems to be a basic equit-
able norm, but as indicated above, it requires flexibility to
prevent inequities in unusual circumstances, as in the Silver
Fox case. 9
Lupton " has discussed various theories and gives a good
bibliography of articles supporting "the sky's the limit"
theory. But he points out that were this maxim actually
adopted, aviation would become entirely impractical. Avia-
tors would need a license to pass over each parcel of land,
or possibly airspace could be condemned by the state for air
highway purposes, or the Federal 'Constitution might be
amended to provide for the use of certain zones or sections
of airspace. In addition, each flight might form the basis for
a number of actions for trespass, causing considerable har-
assment to the aviator. Difficulties would also be experienced
in proving the exact linear paths of the aircraft in its flight
through the various airspaces.
Sweeney 91 has made an excellent collection of old cases
relating to the cujus est solum maxim and which illustrate
the historical development of airspace rights.
Hayden 92 is of the opinion that landowners actually have
dominion over airspace below a minimum altitude to provide
for their comfort and enjoyment of the land, and believes
that the flight of aircraft generally may cause a lawful
nuisance similar to the noises of church bells, automobiles,
newsboys, trains, street cars, and busses. But he concludes
that the physical presence of low flying planes over the land
89 Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., [1932] U.S. Av.
R. 164 (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Neb., Omaha Div. 1931).
90 LUPTON, op. cit. supra note 77, §§ 37 et seq.
91 Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Aviator
in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. AIR L. 329, 355-8 (1932).
92 Hayden, The New Deal in Airspace Rights, 10 J. AiR L. 158 (1939).
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or buildings causing the landowners to be fearful of injury
to life or property is an actionable trespass as well as a
nuisance.
Rhyne " recently was of the opinion that the common
law on the question of airspace rights was not written until
the present era, so that the common law applicable to other
rights does not apply, and that statutes alone fix air space
rights in the field of aviation. This theory, however, resolves
neither the many cases which did not arise under statutes
nor the conflicting applications of older common law rules
to actions involving aeronautics.
D. Special Situations:
Many special abuses should be given particular considera-
tion. Included within this abusive aerial activity is acrobatic
flying. 4 It has been held that a landowner may enjoin
acrobatic or stunt flying over his land at any altitude. He
need not be subjected to the special risks of this dangerous
activity. 5
Another generally abusive type aerial activity is low
level flying. This, however, has received much conflicting
treatment, but an analysis of the cases indicates that the
decisions which reached seemingly inequitable results are
generally not based on an unfavorable attitude of the courts
toward the landowner's rights, but rather on a mistaken
theory of the case, possibly so presented to the court by the
attorney for the aggrieved land occupant. For example, in
contrast to the failure to recover in the Nebraska Silver Fox
case, 96 a Nebraska court in Glatt v. Page " enjoined flights
93 RPnyE, AiRPORTS AND THE CoURTS 82-3 (1944).
94 HEARTmw, AVIATION LAw DIOEST 195 (1941).
95 Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., [1928] U.S. Av. R. 42 (Ramsey
County, Minn.).
96 Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v. Boeing Air Transport Inc., [1932] U.S. Av.
R. 164 (U.S. Dist. Ct., D. Neb., Omaha Div. 1931).
97 3rd Jud. Dist. Docket 93-115, Dist. Ct. Neb. 1928, cited in RHYN, op. cit.
supra note 93, at 84.
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below 100 feet over a poultry farm, because the flights had
allegedly caused the hens to stop laying eggs. In contrast, it
was held in Commonwealth v. Nevin 98 that low flying was
not a trespass, because under Pennsylvania law, physical
contact with the land was required for a trespass. This
clearly indicates that the decision resulted from the mis-
take of the attorney in his theory of the case. On the
other hand, flights below 1,000 feet over a camp for children
were enjoined, on the basis that the camp was a congested
area, and because under a statute such flights were pro-
hibited over a "congested area." 9 In addition, the court held
that the noise, distraction, and the source of danger of the
flights constituted a nuisance which would be abated.
Aerial sightseeing and photography require special con-
sideration. In Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, Inc.,'01 the
aeronaut was held not liable for taking aerial photographs of
the hotel since he notified the hotel sufficiently in advance to
allow the sunbathers to retire from the roof. The court also
held that the height at which one becomes a trespasser
depends upon the particular facts and not on the Air Com-
merce Regulations. A flyer may pass over property without
the owner's consent, if he does so in a reasonable manner
and at a height which does not unreasonably interfere with
the owner's complete enjoyment of the surface and space
above it which he occupies. In this case, the photograph
had been requested by the hotel owner and the court seems
to imply 101 that the reasonable minimum altitude for normal
through passage may be lower than for sightseeing or photo-
graphic flights.
The possibility of results differing solely because of the
presentation of a case by the attorney, particularly in new
98 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1922), cited in RiYlE, op. cit. supra note 93, at 83.
99 Mohican & Reena Inc. v. Tobiasz, [1938] U.S. Av. R. 1 (Hampton
County, Mass.).
100 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. N.Y. 1936).
101 Id. at 982.
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branches of the law, such as aviation law, is further shown
by two New York cases. In 1921, Judge Cardozo held that
a hydroplane was a vessel while afloat upon navigable waters
and subject to admiralty jurisdiction. In his opinion, he
referred to the fact that the Treasury Department of the
United States required seaplanes and hydroplanes to be
registered as vessels." 2 Yet in 1922, another New York
court held that a hydroplane was not required to have a
muffler on its engine when operated on lakes and waters
as required by state statute applicable to floating struc-
tures.10 3 This was its conclusion even though it admitted: 104
".. . the evil then [1913] aimed at [by the statute] was
the noise ... of the exhaust from motor boats and similar
structures upon the waters of the lake." The amendment
of the statute in 1917 did not change this terminology,
so the court concluded that hydroplanes were not within
the intent of the law. The court apparently did not consider
the fact that it was the noise which was prohibited and since
the legislature probably understood the law to cover hydro-
planes, it had not amended it specifically to enumerate them,
as the statute had general applicability to all floating struc-
tures. Had the attorney presented the facts as in the former
case and referred to the Cardozo opinion, the decision might
have been quite different.
E. Airspace Rights in Foreign Jurisdiction:
It is of special interest to note the contemporaneous
growth of this new phase of law in other countries, since it
is one of the few new developments in our law which need
not be inherited but can be a truly American policy. The
English law is of particular interest, since the principles of
our common law which inevitably affect our legal thinking,
102 Reinhardt v. Newport, 252 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921).
103 People ex rel. Cushing v. Smith, 119 Misc. 294, 196 N.Y. Supp. 241 (Sup.
Ct. 1922), ilev'd, 206 App. Div. 642, 198 N.Y. Supp. 940 (3d Dep't 1923).
104 Id., 196 N.Y. Supp. at 242.
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even in new fields, have descended from it. In England, the
English Air Navigation Act of 1920 now supersedes the
common law in aviation cases. The pertinent provision on
airspace rights states:.. 5
No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of
nuisance, by reason only of the flight of aircraft over any
property at a height above the ground, which, having regard
to wind, weather, and all the circumstances of the case is
reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of such flight, so long
as the provisions of this Act and any Order made thereunder
and of the Convention are duly complied with....
The question of liability thus depends upon a determination
of what is reasonable in each case.
The French law, which permits a separate interpretation
of the law as applied to each case, provides in Article 19,
May 13, 1924, that ". . . the right of aircraft to fly over
privately owned land cannot be exercised under conditions
such as to interfere with rights of the owner." "06 This seems
to indicate that the "effective user" theory is the law of
France.
It is interesting to note that the English law is written
in a manner primarily guaranteeing the rights of the aviator,
whereas the French law is written primarily to guarantee the
rights of the landowner; yet both set essentially the same
measure for the rights of each party.
F. Uniform State Law for Aeronautics:
In this country, attempts have been made to obtain a
uniform code covering the more important aspects of aviation
law. Some states have adopted the Uniform Aeronautics Act
or slight modifications of it. 1'07 Among the more important
provisions, the following define the controversial question of
rights in airspace: 10I
105 Air Navigation Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Go. 5, 80, § 9.
106 As cited in Bouve, supra note 88, at 399.
107 11 UNFoR LAWS AN. 157 et seq. (1938). This Act was withdrawn by
the National Conference of CommLsioners on Uniform State Laws in 1943.
108 UNFORm AFRONAUTICS AcT §§ 3-5; 11 UmiFoRm LAWS ANN. 160-1 (1938).
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§ 3. Ownership in Space-The ownership of the space
above the lands and waters of this State is declared to be
vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject
to the right of flight described in Section 4.
§ 4. Lawfulness of Flight-Flight in aircraft over the
lands and waters of this State is lawful, unless at such a low
altitude as to interfere with the then existing use to which
the land or water, or the space over the land or water, is put
by the owner, or unless so conducted as to be imminently
dangerous to persons or property lawfully on the land or
water beneath....
§ 5. Damage on Land-The owner of every aircraft which
is operated over the lands or waters of this State is absolutely
liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water
beneath, caused by the ascent, descent, or flight of the aircraft,
or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether
such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused
in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured,
or of the owner or bailee of the property injured....
Section 5 has been varied in many states to change the
responsibility of the aeronaut, some limiting liability to
negligence or to a rebuttable prima facie liability, as well
as to other detailed features.
These and similar statutory provisions generally are not
limited to any specific type of aircraft operation. They
involve taking-off, landing and, consequently, airport opera-
tion as it affects adjoining airspace over another's land.
And the concentration of activity in airspace adjacent an
airport magnifies the conflict of interests between the aero-
naut and the landowner.
IV.
Airspace Rights as Affected by Proximity to Airports
A. Relative Rights in General of Aeronauts and Surface
Occupants in Airspace Near Airports:
The general rules regarding airspace rights are applicable
to airspace near airports with some limitation in certain
jurisdictions favoring the aeronaut and the airport operator.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Generally the right of the surface occupant to absolute
dominion of the skies has been denied with reference to
airport approaches. The amount of approach airspace re-
quired has increased with the development of aircraft and
this fact poses increasingly important problems. Larger
planes demand longer approach zones and produce more
pronounced sound and vibration penetrations into space for
greater distances. Various statutes give minimum altitudes
for flight over different places,' 019 but normal airport opera-
tion necessitates passage through airspace at heights varying
from ground level to normal flight level. With present day
planes, the approach zones may extend for considerable
distances, and were large planes limited to minimum altitudes
beyond relatively short approach zones, a radical revision
in plane design would be required to increase the angle of
climb and descent. Or the larger planes might be forced to
circle the airport to attain the desired minimum altitude.
In resolving these technical problems affecting the use
of the airspace adjacent to airports, the courts have reached
various conclusions. The aeronaut has been given the great-
est freedom where it is considered that an actual touching
of the surface is necessary for trespass."' Other jurisdictions
have held that unless the airspace is reduced to actual pos-
session, it cannot be owned; and, while the surface occupant
has a prior right to take possession, unless he does, there
can be no trespass. This may be carried to absurd limits
at times. In Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport,"' the court
refused to enjoin flights as low as five feet above the surface
or to award damages caused by the flights on the ground
that they were not trespasses and that there were no actual
or substantial damages. It said: 112 "We own so much of
109 For an illustrative statute, see N.Y. GEar. Bus. LAW § 245 (5) (1941).
110 Commonwealth v. Nevin, 2 Pa. D. & C. 241 (1922), cited in R=NE,
op. cit. supra note 93, at 83.
111 84 F. (2d) 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431,
81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
112 Id., 84 F. (2d) at 758.
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the space above the ground as we can occupy or make use
of, in connection with the enjoyment of our land." The
court's reasoning and statement of law may provide an
equitable adjustment of the conflicting interests, but its
application of the law to the facts may well be questioned
as a sagacious course between the Scylla and Charybdis of
the case. And while the Supreme Court of the United States
denied certiorari in this case,113 it held in another case which
involved the passage of artillery projectiles over the plain-
tiff's land, that 114 "Every successive trespass adds to the
force of the evidence."
Generally, the surface occupant's absolute rights terminate
entirely at the height beyond which he cannot profitably use
his land." 5 This does not exclude all airspace not actually
occupied, for usable airspace may vary, even from season
to season as in farming, and a flexible rule which will adapt
itself to the current use and needs of the land occupant is
required. The land occupant, after all, still retains prior
right to the beneficial use of the airspace. An equitable
solution might include enjoining ascents and descents over
a farm during certain periods to allow normal tillage and
harvesting of crops. It might require the farmer to notify the
airport of the period he would be so occupied. This would
not give the aeronaut or the airport a private easement in
the airspace, but some proponents favoring easements in
113 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed.
865 (1937).
114 Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
330,43 S. Ct. 135, 67 L. Ed. 287 (1922).
115 In Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., [19282 U.S. Av. R. 42
(Ramsey County, Minn.), the court said with reference to the cujus est solum
maxim: "This rule, like many aphorisms of the law, is a generality, and does
not have its origin in legislation, but was adopted in an age of primitive industrial
development . . . as a comprehensive statement of the landowner's rights, at a
time when any practical use of the upper air was not considered or thought
possible, and when such aerial trespasses as did occur were relatively near
to the surface of the land, and were such as to exercise some direct harmful
influence upon the owner's use and enjoyment. of the land. . . . The upper air
is a natural heritage common to all people, and its reasonable use ought not
to be hampered by an ancient artificial maxim of law .... "
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airspace hold that surface owners have exclusive dominion
subject to an easement in favor of all aircraft to use the
superjacent airspace in a reasonable manner." 6 The ease-
ment is not private but public, so that no prescriptive rights
accrue and it is limited to transit, thus excluding hovering
or circling. This view is supported by the Hinman case," 7
which held that continuous use will not ripen into an ease-
ment through the airspace above another's land.
A general understanding of the problem of airport ap-
proaches requires a sympathetic attitude toward the annoy-
ances and the very real depreciation in value of the land-
owner's property because of its proximity to an airport. But,
of course, the rights of an aeronaut to ascent and descent
must also be respected.
B. Airport Airspace Approaches:
The problem of airport approaches is an instance where
judicial legislation has proceeded largely according to Jeremy
Bentham's theory of weighing the "pleasures" and "pains"
of the situations, rather than according to the basic rights
of the parties involved. It appears that the theory on which
a case is based has a decided 'influence in the cases where
no statutory provision exists to determine the rights of the
parties, although in some instances the courts are extremely
favorable to one or the other. For instance, in Smith v. New
England Aircraft Co.,"' the plaintiff's estate was adjacent
the airport and airplanes flew low over the land but rose
quickly in making ascents. The courts held that because no
serious damage was shown, it was not a trespass to the land
and that no injunction would be granted, because it was
not a nuisance to the property or livestock. Mere apprehen-
sion of danger was not considered sufficient to warrant an
116 See the discussion of this theory -in LUP'TON, op. cit. supra note 77, § 51.
117 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
118 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
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injunction enjoining the flights. An injunction, it was
thought, would be a detriment to the public without being
a counterbalancing benefit to the landowner.
The Hinman case I" arrived at essentially the same
result, where damages were sought for low level ascents and
descents over land adjoining an airport. The court held that
the airport would acquire no prescriptive right in airspace by
adverse use and that actual use by the landowner must be
shown to prove injury and damage. The court rejected the
contention that the surface occupant should be alloWed
airspace to a reasonable height above the land free from
penetration though not actually used by him. This seems
rather inequitable when it is remembered that as a general
rule, owners of elevated railways, overhead storerooms, and
similar aerial structures pay the landowner for the use
of the superjacent airspace. 2 °
The harshness of the above decisions might be said to
justify the action of landowners in placing obstructions to
undesired flights over their land, but "spite" structures are
generally forbidden. Usually there must be proof of actual
spite and malice, and if proved, the offending landowner is
compelled to remove the obstruction at his own expense. 2'
In most cases the landowner could develop good reasons
for the presence of the obstructions and successfully defend
their existence. But usually, he is so vehement in asserting
his claim to the airspace that he fails to justify the obstruc-
tions.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. von Bestecki,"2 ' the
erection of towers was enjoined as a public nuisance to the
state-owned airport nearby, because the towers served no
good purpose.
119 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
120 LuToY, op. cit. supra note 77, §52.
121 Rhyne, The Legal Ezperi ence of Airports, 11 J. An L. 297, 312 (1940).
122 [1938J U.S. Av. R. 1 (Dauphin County, Pa. 1937).
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Another example of a legally unsuccessful though physi-
cally ingenious spite obstruction is found in Tucker v. United
Air Lines, Inc.'23 In this case, the landowner planted quick
growing poplar trees near the airfield boundary. This effort
was so successful, that soon planes using the airport were
clipping the tops of 35-foot trees. The landowner insisted on
his "ad coelum" land rights. The court enjoined flights under
30 feet over the land and enjoined obstructions over 25 feet
high. Some good reasons undoubtedly could have been
found for the existence of the trees on the land, but none
were advanced and the result was an injunction against the
free use of the land. Unfortunately, for the determination
of the rule of law, no appeal was taken from this decision,
as Tucker's farm was purchased by the airport.
Arbitrary rules and statutes limiting the height of the
landowner's airspace rights ignore the basic rights of the
occupant of the land and prescribe merely a course which
appears expedient under the circumstances. A well reasoned
opinion illustrating this problem was rendered by the
Attorney General of Michigan 124 regarding the validity of
a statute prohibiting the erection of any structure within
1,000 feet of the boundary of a licensed airport to a
height greater than the ratio of one-to-twenty from the
nearest boundary. The opinion was that it was an unconsti-
tutional taking of property without due process and not
within the police power of the state. He cited the case of
Piper v. Ekern,"2 5 in which a Wisconsin zoning law prohibit-
ing erection of buildings over 90 feet in height on a street
adjacent the state capitol was declared unconstitutional on
the above grounds.
Of course, the property in the airspace could be obtained
by purchase, lease, or condemnation proceedings. 126 But even
123 [1936] U.S. Av. R. 10 (Dist. Ct. Johnson County, Iowa 1935).
124 Reprinted in [1939] U.S. Av. R. 18.
125 180Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1923).
126 It has been suggested that acquisition of airport approaches rights by
eminent domain might be considered as obtaining a right of way over the
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if zoning ordinances are valid as to future erections, they
should be held invalid when retroactive. 2 ' And it has been
ventured that obstructions to flying may be regulated by the
Secretary of Commerce or by Congress under the Commerce
Clause. 2 '
The Uniform Airports Act of 1935 effectively resolves
conflicts surrounding airspace approach rights. Section 7
provides that: ...
Where necessary, in order to provide unobstructed air
space for the landing and taking off of aircraft utilizing air-
ports and landing fields acquired or maintained under the
provisions of this act, the counties, municipalities, and other
subdivisions of this state are hereby granted authority to
acquire such air rights over private property as are necessary
to insure safe approaches to the landing areas of said airports
and landing fields. Such air rights may be acquired by grant,
purchase, lease or condemnation in the same manner as is
provided in Section 3 of this act....
Even without this statute, certain courts have recognized
the rule expressed by it as a constitutional right of the
property owner. Typical is Mutual Chemical Co. v. Balti-
more,1 30 where it was held unconstitutional to limit the
height of structures to five feet within 100 feet of an airport
boundary and to allow gradually increasing heights at
further distances. This was deemed a taking of property
without compensation since it prevented all use of the land
subject to the five-foot restriction.
The following ten general methods for controlling airport
approaches have been suggested.' 3 ' Some have been found
mutually satisfactory; others, if not satisfactory, at least
land. Kingsley and Mangham, The Correlative Interests of the Landowner and
the Airman, 3 J. AiR L. 374, 377-8 (1932).
127 LuPToN, op. dt. supra note 77, § 97.
128 Id., §94.
129 11 UNaRm LAws ANN. 196 (1938). This Act was withdrawn by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1943.
130 [1939] U.S. Av. R. 11 (Baltimore City Cir. Ct., Md.).
131 Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. von Bestecki, [1938] U.S. Av. R. 1, 12-9
(Dauphin County, Pa. 1937).
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lawful; others have been declared unconstitutional under
certain conditions; and still others have not yet been tried:
(1) Voluntary action by property owner near the air-
port.
(2) Purchase of land near the airport.
(3) Purchase of airspace rights over land near the
airport.
(4) Acquisition of land near the airport by eminent
domain.
(5) Acquisition of airspace rights by eminent domain.
(6) Police power condemnation of hazards dangerous
to airport use.
(7) Zoning regulations.
(8) Use of commerce power by Federal Government.
(9) Use of war power by Federal Government.
(10) Use of postal power by Federal Government.
The determination of the value of airspace is most difficult,
but the purchase of airspace rights over land near an airport
is at present the best solution to this problem.
C. Airport Nuisance by Effects on Nearby Airspace:
Very few injunctions have been granted on the basis of an
airport being a nuisance per se 13 and as a general rule, acts
constituting special nuisance must be shown. This require-
ment was not met in the Hinman case where flying at heights
of only five feet over adjoining land was held not a nuis-
ance.' The theory on which these seemingly absurd results
are often based is that the public interest in the operation
of the airport offsets the inconvenience to the individual.
132 For a good discussion supporting this point, see Batcheller v. Common-
wealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E. (2d) 529, 531 (1940).
133 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 300 U.S. 654, 57 S. Ct. 431, 81 L. Ed. 865 (1937).
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This is a misconception of the basic law respecting the rights
of the property owner for this theory should only be used to
determine whether condemnation proceedings are justified
or not, and not whether an uncompensated infringement of
the landowner's rights is justifiable. Usually, if the annoy-
ance becomes an unbearable burden, it will be held a
nuisance and enjoined.134
The main factors relied upon to label an annoyance a
nuisance are injury to livestock or danger to normal use
of land, annoying quantities of dust, and excessive noise.
Gay v. Taylor 135 illustrates almost all of the possible
types of private nuisances, and in this case the airfield
operation was permanently enjoined, even though a state
license had been obtained. The court held that the license
did not give the operator the right to maintain a private
nuisance. It was shown that great quantities of dust were
blown into the plaintiff's house. In addition, the engine
repair and warm-up operations were performed near the
hangars, causing an annoying and excessive noise. Further-
more, planes coming in for landings flew low over the house
and were a hazard. At times articles were dropped from the
planes on the property. The field runways were so located
and the prevailing winds were such that normal use of the
airfield brought dust into houses which were farther away
than the plaintiff's house. Also, low flying planes often dis-
turbed hospital patients about a half mile away. These and
sundry other nuisances together were held to constitute a
continuing nuisance.
Another good illustration and definition of airspace rights
adjoining an airfield is given in Thrasher v. Atlanta.'3 The
City of Atlanta operated an airport near the plaintiff's
property and in using the airfield, planes blew dust into the
134 Thrasher v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Gay v. Taylor,
[19341 U.S. Av. R. 146 (Chester County, Pa. 1932).
135 [19341 U.S. Av. R. 146 (Chester County, Pa. 1932).
136 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
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plaintiff's house. This not only caused great inconvenience
but also made his wife sick with resultant medical expenses.
The court held that while an airport is not a nuisance per se,
it might be constructed and operated so as to become one,
and the unnecessary creation of dust was held to be a
nuisance for which damages might be recovered and an
injunction issued. The court also pointed out that apprehen-
sion of injury from falling planes is not, in and of itself,
sufficient cause for an injunction against aerial navigation.
Acts which might not make an airport a nuisance in a
rural locality may cause it to be one if located in a residential
district, for the hazards of low flying and noises in the latter
situation almost inevitably constitute the airport a nuisance,
although it is not a nuisance per se. And its further operation
might be enjoined to prevent substantial injury to the
property rights of the nearby residents 137 or its use might
be limited to special flights at certain heights.'38
It has also been held that bright lights of an airport
operated by the United States may cause the surrounding
private land to be appropriated by the Government,'39 espec-
ially when accompanied by noise and dust incident to airport
operation, and by leaflets dropped from planes.
Landowners also are protected in their superior right to
the normal and beneficial use of their land in some jurisdic-
tions according to basic law. In Capitol Airways, Inc. v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 4 ' it was held that although
it might constitute a hazard to air navigation and interfere
with the use of the adjacent airspace, an uninsulated power
line on 90-foot towers, like smoke stacks and other proper
uses of land in industry, did not constitute a case for injunc-
137 Crew v. Gallagher, [1947] U.S. Av. R. 342 (Chester County, Pa. 1946).
138 People v. Dycer Flying Service, Inc., [19391 U.S. Av. R. 21 (Los Angeles
Sup. Ct., Cal.).
139 United States v. Causby et ux., 328 U.S. 256, 259, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 90 L. Ed.
1206 (1946).
140 215 Ind. 462, 18 N.E. (2d) 776 (1939).
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tive relief. It has been suggested, however, that the land-
owner be required to illuminate at night unusual obstructions
in the airspace, especially near airports and in air traffic
lanes.'41
Judging from the different rules which have been adopted
in various jurisdictions governing the rights of the land-
owner, aeronaut, and airport operator with respect to air-
space near airports, it seems highly desirable that a uniform
code be adopted. Probably the most equitable statement of
these rights is in Section 7 of the Uniform Airports Act of
1935.142 However, other statutory regulation of these rights
might be desirable if no uniform act is acceptable to most
of the states. The present federal acts do not regulate these
activities, but proposals have been made which might give
a suitable basis for desired uniformity, 4 3 even though the
states would retain primary jurisdiction over real property.
V.
Government Control and Regulation
of Certain Airspace Rights
While the States and not the Federal Government control
real property, there might be adequate reason for Congress
to establish certain airspace regulations affecting interstate
aviation and the postal service. Rules of the road 114 could
prescribe minimum height of flight at various speeds over
different areas for aircraft engaged in interstate commerce.
Regulation of structures likely to interfere with flight might
also be valid under both the postal and interstate commerce
powers. This might serve to accelerate the adoption of uni-
form codes by the states, for the detailed regulation still
141 Lmn'TrOw, op. cit. supra note 77, §53.
142 11 UNFom LAws ANx. 196 (1938).
143 For a typical proposal, see REsTAITMENT, ToRTs § 194 (1934).
144 For a detailed discussion of this feature, see Zoilman, Governmental
Control of Aircraft, 53 Am. L. Ray. 897 (1919).
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remains essentially within the jurisdiction of the states.'45
Several very important rights in airspace have been defined
by the Air Commerce Act and the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Section 3 of Title 1 of the Civil Aeronautics Act states: 146
There is recognized and declared to exist in behalf of any
citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit
in air commerce through the navigable air space of the
United States.
Section 10 of the Air Commerce Act reads: 147
Navigable airspace.-As used in this Act, the term "navi-
gable airspace" means airspace above the minimum safe
altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity, and such navigable airspace shall be subject to a public
right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in
conformity with the requirements of this Act.
This indicates that a fine start in providing uniformity in
airspace rights has been made, although this phase of avia-
tion law requires still more state legislation to provide a
uniform and just solution, particularly with reference to
airspace approaches.' 48 The Civil Aeronautics Act has en-
couraged uniformity since it authorized the regulation of
rates, routes, and safety features, the licensing of the pilots
and crew members, and the investigation of accidents and
trade practices in interstate and foreign commerce.' 49
In considering legislation and judicial determinations
affecting airspace rights, the right of society to enjoy the
fruits of industrial progress should be paramount only when
there is no clear infringement of established rights. These
include, for example, the right to the normal use and full
enjoyment of land without interference and annoyance by
145 LuPTON, op. cit. supra note 77, §94.
146 52 STAT. 980 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 403 (1946).
147 44 STAT. 574 (1926), as amended, 52 STAT. 1028 (1938), 49 U.S.C.
§180 (1946).
148 For a discussion of the constitutional restraints imposed on Congress in
this sphere, see Federal and State Jurisdiction over Civil Aviation, 12 J. AnR L.
25, 26 (1941).
149 A more complete discussion of these points is given in Hester, The Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 9 J. AiR L. 451 (1938).
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aeronautical activities. Of course, this does not mean that
eccentricities or supersensitivities should lead to unreason-
able prohibitions or restrictions on aeronautics, but if the
social or community interest clashes with rights of the land
occupant, the solution should not be to deprive him of his
rights, but to compensate him for the rights which he yields
in the improvement of the social interest involved. It would
seem proper also to require a license fee or other tax to be
paid by those in aeronautics for this activity should be
required to pay its way. And until a uniform code is adopted
by the states, it continues to be the attorney's duty to
determine the airspace rights under local law, and to advance
equitable solutions, as well as to advocate uniform legislation
defining airspace rights.
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